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ABSTRACT
Information Centric Networks (ICNs) have emerged in recent years as a new networking paradigm for
the next-generation Internet. The primary goal of these networks is to provide e ective mechanisms
for content distribution and retrieval based on in-network content caching. The design of di erent
ICN architectures addressed many of the security issues found in the traditional Internet. Therefore,
allowing for a secure, reliable, and scalable communication over the Internet. However, recent re-
search studies showed that these architectures are vulnerable to di erent types of DDoS attacks. In
this paper, we propose a defense mechanism against distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) in
path-identifier based information centric networks. The proposed mechanism, called LogDos, per-
forms GET Message logging based filtering and employs Bloom filter based logging to store incoming
GETmessages such that corresponding content messages are verified, while filtering packets originating
frommalicious hosts. We develop three versions of LogDos with varying levels of storage overhead at
LogDos-enabled router. Extensive simulation experiments show that LogDos is very e ective against
DDoS attacks as it can filter more than 99.98 % of attack tra c in di erent attack scenarios while
incurring acceptable storage overhead.
1. Introduction
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks represent a
major threat for traditional and future network architectures.
Today’s Internet has witnessed major DDoS attack incidents
and attack rates have exceeded unprecedented limits. These
attacks continue to grow in number and sophistication as ev-
ident by several attack incidents that were reported recently.
For example, major DDoS attack targeted Github in March
2018 with aggregate tra c rate that exceeded 1.7 Tbps [27].
This came after the major incident of the well known DDoS
attack on the DNS provider Dyn in October 2016 with a traf-
fic rate around 1.2 Tbps. The Dyn attack originated from
thousands of Internet of Things (IoT) devices controlled by
the Mirai botnet [5]. DDoS attacks are not limited to tradi-
tional computer networks. They represent a major issue in
di erent types of network architectures and systems such as
software defined networks, cloud computing, edge/fog com-
puting, vehicular networking, smart grid systems and named
data networks. It is clear that preventing andmitigating these
attacks is becoming a priority in network security in general,
and there is a pressing need to address this issue in future In-
ternet architectures as well.
Information Centric Networking (ICN) [29] has emerged
as a future Internet communicationmodel to address the need
of having e ective ways to provide content distribution and
retrieval. Several network architectures were proposed in re-
cent years to realize this communicationmodel. This include
NamedData Networks (NDN) [13] and Path-Identifier based
ICN. NDN is based on Content Centric Networking (CCN)
architecture, where content providers distribute their content
to a large number of nodes (i.e., content stores), and content
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consumers obtain certain content by sending interest mes-
sages. A node that has the requested content replies back
with a DATA message containing that content. Routing in
these networks is di erent than that in the traditional IP net-
works. NDN relies on maintaining a Pending Interest Ta-
ble (PIT) at each NDN router where outstanding interests
and their arrival interface is stored such that content produc-
ers inject their tra c to be sent to the consumer traversing
the same path followed by the interest messages. On the
other hand, Path-ID based ICNs rely on using Path Identi-
fiers (PIDs) to identify paths between network domainswhere
these PIDs are added to interestmessages along the path to
the content provider such that content follow back the same
path. Details of the two approaches are presented in Section
2.
Both NDN and PID-based ICNs are vulnerable to di er-
ent types of DDoS attacks [24, 21, 22]. In NDN, PIT can be
overloaded with flood of fake interest messages that would
populate PITs with huge number of entries that correspond
to fake interest messages resulting in a PIT overflow prob-
lem. On the other hand, in PID-based information centric
networks the feasibility of DDoS attacks depends on attack-
ers ability to learn path identifiers. In some PID-based archi-
tectures, PIDs are globally advertised and become public.
Therefore, PIDs can be learned easily by attackers. How-
ever, in other PID-based architectures (e.g., [22]), it is rec-
ommended that PIDs are kept secret. Therefore, imposing
additional overhead on attackers to learn PIDs. In both cases,
an attacker controlling a set of compromised machines can
know path identifiers using di erent techniques. Therefore,
enabling the attacker to flood targeted systemwith huge amount
of content messages along the learned paths.
In this paper, we propose a novel mechanism to address
the problem of data flooding attack in PID-based ICNs, as
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an extension of our work presented in [4]. The proposed
mechanism, called LogDos, performs GET Message logging
based filtering that is similar to PID-based ICN architectures
in the sense that it uses PIDs to perform inter-domain rout-
ing. However, we add GET message digests at ICN routers
along the path to the content provider in a flavor similar to
that used in PIT based NDN architecture aiming at filter-
ing content packets that do not correspond to previously re-
quested content. Storing GET message digits allows for ver-
ifying content messages while maintaining minimal storage
at intermediate routers. The main contributions of the paper
are as follows.
• We propose LogDos as a novel mechanism to address
the problem of data flooding attack in PID-based ICNs.
To the best of our knowledge, LogDos is a unique
hybrid approach that combines the best of NDN net-
works and PID-based ICNs. In order to reduce the
storage overhead at LogDos-Enabled routers, we uti-
lize Bloom Filters to store message digests in such a
way that allows the verification of the corresponding
data messages.
• We propose three variants of the LogDos scheme aim-
ing at lowering the storage and processing overhead
while achieving e cient filtering of attack tra c, namely
the mechanisms based on 1) comprehensive-logging,
2) odd/even-logging, and 3) dynamic-logging. We demon-
strate that the proposed LogDos mechanisms do not
incur any communication overhead and are not a ected
by attackers ability to learn path IDs.
• We developed an event driven simulator [2] for mod-
elling the path-ID based ICNs, consisting of modules
for realistic Internet AS topology modeling, routing,
packet representation and LogDos mechanisms. Ex-
tensive simulation experiments using large-scale net-
work topologies and realistic attack scenarios are con-
ducted for evaluating the LogDosmechanisms in terms
of the e ectiveness in preventingDDoS attacks in Path
ID-based ICNs and a quantification of the storage over-
head required to log packets.
• The experimental results show that LogDos mecha-
nisms are very e ective in countering data flooding at-
tacks by adjusting bloom filter parameters at LogDos-
enabled routers. Our findinda indicate that the overall
attack rate observed at the victim did not exceed 0.3
Mbps, 7 Mbps, 50 Mbps, and 17 Mbps out of aggre-
gate attack rate of 3 Gbps for comprehensive-logging,
even-logging, odd-logging and dynamic-logging, re-
spectively. This is by large far away from the rate ob-
served at the victim in case ofD-PIDmechanismwhen
attackers perform periodic PID learning.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we present the background information and attack model.
Previous works are discussed in 3. Our mechanism is pre-
sented in Section 4. Evaluation is presented in Section 5.
Finally, conclusion is presented in Section 6.
2. Background and Attack Model
Information Centric Networking (ICN) is emerging as
a future Internet architecture to satisfy the current trend of
using the Internet mainly for information dissemination as
users are mostly interested in accessing information regard-
less of its location, and to address shortcomings of current
host centric Internet and to provide better security and mo-
bility support. ICN focuses on providing e cient ways to
deliver content (information) to recipients. This includes the
use of in-network storage and caching mechanisms, content
naming approaches, and secure routing techniques. To this
end, several information centric architectures have been pro-
posed in recent years to meet these requirements. In this
paper, we focus our discussion on two architectures that rep-
resent main approaches for content request and content rout-
ing in Information Centric Networks. These architectures
are the Named data networks [13] and a path-ID based ICN
architecture called CoLoR [20].
2.1. Named Data Networking
Two types of packets are used in NDN: interest mes-
sages and DATA messages. NDN routers forward interests
towards the content producer responsible for the requested
name, using name prefixes for routing. A content message
includes a name, a payload and a digital signature computed
by the content producer. Names are composed of one or
more components, which have a hierarchical structure. In
NDN notation,"/" separates name components (e.g., just/
cit/content1). Content is delivered to consumers only upon
explicit request. Each request corresponds to an interest
message. Unlike content, interests are not signed. An interest
message includes a name of requested content. In case of
multiple content under a given name, optional control infor-
mation can be carried within the interest to restrict desired
content. Content signatures provide data origin authentica-
tion. Each NDN router maintains three data structures that
include: (i) Pending Interest Table (PIT) to record incoming
interest messages and their arrival interfaces (ii) The For-
warding Information Base (FIB) (iii) The Content Store (Cs).
When an NDN router receives an interestmessage it checks
the content store to see if the requested content is available
in which case a content message is sent back through the
same interface where the interest is received. Otherwise, the
router adds an entry to its PIT along with the router interface
where the packet is received. Then it relies on its FIB to for-
ward the interestmessage to upstream router along the path
towards the content provider. A DATAmessage containing the
requested content is then forwarded back to the content con-
sumer along the same path.
2.2. CoLoR Architecture
ColoR was proposed in [20] as an information centric
networking architecture that is based on Path Identifier based
routing. In CoLor, every content is assigned a location and
application-independent and unique service identifier (SID).
The SID is self-certified and remains valid as long as the con-
tent is available. Also, each node is assigned a unique self-
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Figure 1: Operation of CoLoR information centric network
architecture [20].
certified and persistent node identifier (NID) that does not
depend on the node location. Self certification in both SID
and NID servers the purpose of authentication without the
need of an external authority. The reachability information
of content is maintained by a logical resource manger (RM)
in each domain. Resource managers in di erent domains
maintain certain relationship with each other (e.g., provider,
customer, or peer) and each node within a domain knows
the location of the resource manager of that domain. Rout-
ing within a domain is done based on intra routing algorithm.
Routing between domains is done based on virtual path name
which consists of list of path identifiers (PIDs) assigned to
links between border routers.
The operation of CoLoR is illustrated in Figure 1 which
shows a network of three domains with a resourcemanger for
each domain. A GETmessage is issued from node A to obtain
certain piece of content. The message includes content SID
and node’s A NID (the consumer) get content with SID, and
is forwarded to the local resource manager (RM1). Assum-
ing that the request content is available at some provider B in
domain 3, RM1 appends the path identifier of the path con-
necting domain 1 to domain 2 (i.e., PID12) which is along
the path to the requested content. Once the message reaches
domain 2, it is forwarded to RM2 in order to decide on the
next hop towards the requested content. RM2 appends PID23
as the GET message and forwards it to the router connecting
domain 2 with domain 3. Finally, RM3, forwards this mes-
sage to node B which is located in domain 3. Since the list
of PIDs along the path from consumer to provider is already
encapsulate in the message, the provider (i.e., node B in this
example) can send the content back along the same path. At
each router along the backward path, path identifier connect-
ing one domain to another is removed from the list.
2.3. DDoS attacks in Path Identifier-based
Information Centric Networks
Data flooding attack is a type of DDoS attacks that can
potentially target path identifier based information centric
networks. In this attack, botnet machines are instructed to
flood the target machine/network with high volume of data
packets. Typically, in these networks, content is delivered
from a provider to a consumer along the path followed by
the GETmessage by including the list of received PIDs in the
reply message as explained in Subsection 2.2. However, in
an attack scenario, data packets are flooded towards the tar-
get directly (i.e., Not in a response to GET requests). This
requires the attacker to know path identifiers (PIDs) used in
the network.
Figure 2: Data flooding attacks in CoLoR [22].
Figure 2 shows a typical attack scenario. Nodes A, B,
and C represent attack nodes that flood the target (node D)
with data packets along the paths, PID34-PID23-PID12, PID35-
PID23-PID12, PID26-PID12, respectively. It is clear that
making path identifiers public allows attackers to easily launch
data flooding attacks. Changing path identifiers dynamically
as proposed in [21] can reduce the e ect of data flooding at-
tacks and imposes additional constraints on attackers. Also,
it was shown in [22] that keeping PIDs secret can reduce the
impact of these attacks. However, both strategies do not pre-
vent DDoS attacks completely as attackers can use di erent
techniques to learn path IDs in real-time. These include in-
terest luring and botnet cooperation techniques [22].
2.4. Adversary Model
In the system model, we consider attackers who have the
ability to flood the target system with high volume DATAmes-
sages from di erent attack machines clustered in multiple
autonomous systems. Typically, such machines are part of
a botnet controlled by the attacker. Before launching data
flooding attacks, the list of path IDs along each attack path
towards the victim should be learned. In [22], two mecha-
nisms were proposed to learn path IDs assuming that they
are kept secret. The first mechanism, called interest luring,
relies on setting up a content server that hosts a popular con-
tent. Therefore, luring GET messages from consumers and
learning PIDs found in these messages. The second mech-
anism, called botnet cooperation, relies on exchanging GET
messages between di erent bot machines. Therefore, allow-
ing the attacker to learn portion of PIDs along the paths fol-
lowed by thesemessages. In addition, we assume that amali-
cious or compromised provider can still orchestrate the data
flooding attack as it has full knowledge of the path repre-
sented by the list of PIDs contained in the received GETmes-
sages. In such a scenario, the attacker can collect PID infor-
mation and craft fake data packets. Also, it is possible for
the attacker to learn portion of PIDs through one or multi-
ple compromised routers. A compromised router on the path
would have a good knowledge of the path and hence can or-
chestrate the attack.
3. Previous Work on DDoS attacks in ICN
Distributed denial of service attacks are growing in num-
ber and level of sophistication. Defending against these at-
tacks represent a top priority in today’s Internet due to their
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devastating e ect. Research e orts in this field have resulted
in several techniques and approaches for attack detection,
mitigation, prevention and traceback. For current Internet
infrastructure, large number of DDoS countermeasures were
proposed. For example, several techniques (e.g., Kill-bots
[15], phalanx [9], JUST-Google [3], SkyShield [30] andNet-
fence [19]) have been proposed to mitigate application-layer
DDoS attacks. Other research (e.g., [16, 17]) focused on
identifying the scan sources behind amplification DDoS at-
tacks. In addition to many approaches (e.g., [14, 26, 12]) for
filtering of DDoS attack tra c. With the increased interest
in Information Centric Networking in recent years and the
potential threat of DDoS attacks in these networks, several
mechanisms have been proposed to address this important
issue. The following subsections reviews main research in
the area of DDoS attacks in ICN networks considering two
main types: (i) Interest flooding attacks in NDN and (ii) Data
flooding attacks in path identifier- based ICN.
3.1. Interest Flooding Attacks in NDN
Interest flooding attacks (IFAs) represent a major issue
in named data networks (NDN) [34]. In these attacks, the
Pending Interest Table (PIT) of a router is targeted by high
request rate with spoofed content names. Several mecha-
nisms were proposed to address this type of attacks. The
mechanism proposed in [1] relies on threshold values for
request rate, cache hit ratio, contents rating, and publish-
ers ratings to detect cache pollution attacks. It also devises
some defense mechanisms that depend on the attack sce-
nario, where cache content is replaced based on the rating
of the content and its usage pattern. In [23], a detection
mechanism based on the statistical hypothesis testing theory
was proposed where the detector employs threshold values
that do not depend on users’ behavior on each interface of a
router within the protected network. The paper did not ad-
dress advanced attack types such as those described in [28]
and did not provide mitigation of the attack once detected.
In [31], the importance of implementing Interest NACK into
content centric networks was analyzed and evaluated as a po-
tential solution to interest flooding attacks in these networks
because it helps in evacuating interest tables of ICN routers
without necessarily waiting for each interest until it expires.
Poseidon was proposed in [8] as a framework for interest
flooding attack detection and mitigation by relying on both
local metrics and collaborative techniques for early detec-
tion of interest flooding attacks. InterestFence was proposed
in [10] as a lightweight IFA detection and filtering mech-
anism based by the content server rather than routers. In
[18], bloom filters are used to reduce memory cost at NDN
routers.
3.2. Data Flooding Attacks in Path
Identifier-Based ICN
DDoS attacks in information centric networks that use
path-identifiers (PIDs) for inter-domain routing were inves-
tigated in [21] and [22]. Building on "o  by default" ap-
proach [6] and "capability-based" approaches [32, 25], the
work presented in [21] represents the first mechanism, called
D-PID, to counter data flooding attacks in path-based ICNs.
The paper shows that dynamically changing path IDs be-
tween domains can potentially prevent attackers who have
the ability to learn PIDs from flooding a targeted system by
irrelevant content packets. Moreover, the work presented
in [22] emphasized that keeping PIDs secret is much bet-
ter than making them public from security point of view
and reduces attackers ability to perform DDoS attacks un-
less they use some advanced techniques by which they learn
PIDs. The work presented in [21] and [22] represent a mile-
stone for evaluating PIDs based ICNs resilience for DDoS
attacks by using dynamic PIDs and by keeping PIDs secret.
However, the two approaches su er from major problems.
On one hand, changing PIDs dynamically would result in an
unnecessary overhead and does not prevent DDoS attacks
in case that attacker learn PIDs dynamically. On the other
hand, there are several mechanisms that attackers can use to
learn PIDs even if they are kept secret.
The proposed LogDos mechanism advances the state-of-
the-art in defending against DDoS attacks in path-ID based
ICNs. Mainly, LogDos addresses the problems of D-PID
mechanism proposed in [21] by (i) avoiding the communi-
cation overhead that would result from periodic exchange of
path IDs between adjacent routers (ii) eliminating the need
to keep path IDs secret regardless of the attackers ability to
learn path IDs using interest luring and botnet cooperation
mechanisms described in [22] (iii) Dealing with attack sce-
narios described in Subsection 2.4 which include learning
path IDs through compromised routers or compromised con-
tent providers.
4. Proposed LogDos Mechanism
Wepropose an e ectivemechanism, namedLogDos, that
utilizes GET message logging based filtering to prevent data
flooding attacks in path identifier based information centric
networks. The main idea of the LogDos mechanism is to
log some information contained in the GETmessages passing
through ICN routers such that these routers can verify corre-
sponding response DATA messages. Here, LogDos leverages
the routing symmetry feature in path-ID based ICNs, which
allows an LogDos-enabled router that performed logging of
a given GET message to verify the corresponding DATA mes-
sage. For example, with reference to Figure 3, when a node
Xwhich is a content consumer sends a GETmessage to obtain
certain content and that content is available at node Y (i.e.,
the content provider). Then, based on the routing mecha-
nism of path-ID based ICNs, each LogDos-enabled router
along the path from X to Y will append to the GET message
the path ID assigned to the link between itself and the next
router.
In this example, Router A will append ID1, router B will
append ID2, router C will append ID3 and Router D will
append ID4. At the same time each router, along the path
will log the GET message. Therefore, when the GET message
reaches Y it will contain full path information with list of
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Figure 3: Illustrative example of the proposed mechanism
path IDs: ID1-ID2-ID3-ID4. Node Y responds with a DATA
message containing the requested content and send it along
the same path but in reverse order. Each router along the
path back to node X would be able to verify the validity of
the DATA packet. Attack packets originating from Attacker1
and Attacker 2 and targeting the consumer network along
paths ID6-ID1 and ID5-ID3-ID2-ID1 can be filtered directly
because they don not correspond to previously logged GET
messages. In the following subsections, we present three
versions of LogDos with varying levels of storage overhead
at routers.
4.1. Comprehensive Logging:
In order to reduce the storage overhead associated with
GET messages’ logging, we propose to use Bloom filters [7]
to log GET message digests instead of logging the message
itself or part of it. Description of Bloom Filters is provided
in Appendix A. In the proposed mechanism, we use the SID
and the list of PIDs in the GET message as input for the hash
functions of the bloom filter as they uniquely identify each
GETmessage. In this paper, we refer to logging of all GETmes-
sages at each router as Comprehensive Logging. In theory, if
there exist n LogDos-enabled routers along the path from an
attacker to a victim, then the probability that an attack packet
reaches the victim is given by Equation 1.
Pr(attack) = pn (1)
Where p is the bloom filter’s false positive probability
given by equation 4 in Appendix A. It is to be mentioned
that logging is done at LogDos-enabled router where the GET
message leaves a domain, while verification is done at ICN
routers where the response message enters a domain. This
way, we ensure that logging and verification are done at the
same router, and that a GET message is logged only one time
in each domain. Algorithm 1 shows the comprehensive log-
ging based filtering at an LogDos-enabled router, where the
router logs all GET messages coming through an external in-
terface.
It is to be mentioned that since Bloom filters do not al-
low delete operation, the false positive rate increases with
the number of items that are inserted in Bloom filter to the
extent that it is considered saturate. In order to deal with this
issue, we propose that each LogDoS-enabled router would
Algorithm 1: Comprehensive Logging based fil-
tering
Input : Incoming Packet (P)
Output: Filtering decision
1 for each incoming packet (P) do
2 if (P is a GET message) and (P is coming
through an external interface) then
• Insert P in R’s bloom filter
• Allow P
3 end
4 if (P is a DATA Message) and (P will be
forwarded through an external interface) then
5 if (P is in R’s Bloom Filter) then
• Allow P
6 else
• reject P
7 end
8 end
9 end
maintain at least two Bloom filters such that when the num-
ber of inserted items in the first Bloom filter reaches certain
value that corresponds to the targeted false positive rate, the
router switches to the second bloom filter. A response DATA
message would be validated by checking the two bloom fil-
ters. Once the second bloom filter reaches its limit, the first
bloom filter is reset and new GET messages are inserted in it.
4.2. Odd/Even Logging:
Logging overhead can be reduced significantly by per-
forming logging of GETmessages at certain LogDoS-enabled
routers along the path from content consumer to content provider,
such that verification of corresponding DATAmessages can be
done at the same routers. To achieve this goal, we propose
Odd/Even Logging. In Odd Logging, an LogDos-enabled
router logs GETmessages that have odd number of PIDs. The
corresponding DATAmessages are supposed to have the same
SID and PIDs. Therefore, a LogDos-enabled router is sup-
posed to verify DATAmessages that have odd number of PIDs.
Even logging is similar to Odd logging except that routers
perform logging of GET messages that contain even number
of PIDs and verification is done for DATA messages that con-
tain even number of PIDs. For example, assuming odd log-
ging, the GET messages forwarded from node X to node Y
along the path A, B, C, D, E will be logged only at B and D.
Verification of corresponding DATAmessages will be done by
the same routers since they are supposed to carry odd num-
ber of PIDs by the time it reaches them. Algorithm 2 shows
the odd logging based filtering at a LogDos-enabled router.
A Router only logs GET messages containing an odd number
of PIDs and coming through an external interface (i.e., at the
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router where the GET message enters the domain).
Algorithm 2: Odd Logging based Filtering
Input : Incoming Packet (P)
Output: Filtering decision
1 for each incoming packet (P) do
2 if (P is a GET message) and (P is coming
through an external interface) and (P.list of
PIDs is odd) then
• Insert P in R’s bloom filter
• Allow P
3 end
4 if (P is a DATA Message) and (P will be
forwarded through an external interface) and
(P. list of PIDS is odd) then
5 if (P is in R’s Bloom Filter) then
• Allow P
6 else
• reject P
7 end
8 end
9 end
In this case, then the probability that an attack packet
reaches the victim, assuming that attack path consists of n
LogDos-enabled routers, is given by Equation 2.
Pr(attack) = p‚n_2„ (2)
Even Logging is exactly similar to Odd Logging except
that LogDos-enabled routers log GET message that contain
even number of PIDs. In this case, then the probability that
an attack packet reaches the victim, assuming that attack path
consists of n LogDos-enabled routers, is given by Equation
3.
Pr(attack) = p‰n_2Â (3)
4.3. Dynamic Logging:
In this version of the proposed mechanism, routers per-
form packet logging and validation during certain intervals
that are decided by each router dynamically. Rather than log-
ging GETmessages continuously as in the previous two cases,
logging can be done on and o  as packet logging would not
be required when there is no attack. The proposed dynamic
logging is done as follows. Each router performs logging for
certain period of time T , then goes silent (i.e., without log-
ging) for another period of time S. Initially each router sets
its logging interval to T0 and extends it by the same valueeach time an attack is detected by observing that the number
of invalid DATA messages exceeds certain threshold during
that interval. Validation of DATA packets is done during the
same time interval shifted by small amount of time   in or-
der to account for round trip delay between forwarding a GET
message and receiving the corresponding content message.
Algorithm 3 shows the details of dynamic logging based fil-
tering performed by each router.
Algorithm 3: Dynamic Logging based Filtering
Input : Initial time t0, Silent period T , Initiallogging duration =T0
Output: Filtering decision for each incoming
packet
1 c = 0
2 for each incoming Packet(P) do
3 t= P.arrival_time;
4 if ((t0 < t < t0 + T ) and (P is a GET message)
and (P is coming through an external
interface)) then
• Insert P in R’s bloom filter
• Allow P
5 end
6 if (t0 +   < t < t0 + T +  )) and (P is a
Response Message) and (P will be forwarded
through an external interface) then
7 if (P is in R’s Bloom Filter) then
• Allow P
8 else
• reject P
• c + +
9 end
10 end
11 if (t > t0 + T +  ) then
12 if (c > Threshold) then
• T = T + T0
• c = 0
13 else
• t0 = t0 + T + S
• T = T0
14 end
15 end
16 end
As an illustrative example, let us consider the scenario
shown in Figure 4. In this example, packet logging starts at
time t0 and logging interval T is set to the initial value of T0.
DATA packet validation (i.e., checking that corresponding GET
messages have their digests stored in router’s Bloom filter)
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Figure 4: Dynamic logging based filtering example
starts at time t0 +   in order to account for round trip de-lay. Assuming that the number of invalid response packets
during the logging interval exceeds certain threshold value.
Then an attack is detected, and the logging interval is ex-
tended by another T0 (i.e., T = T + T0). Assuming that noattack is detected during the extended logging period, then
the router switches to the silent mode (i.e., no logging) for a
period of S seconds. After that the start time t0 is update to
t0 + T + S and the same process repeats.
5. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the e ectiveness of our proposed
LogDos scheme in preventing data flooding attacks in path-
ID based ICNs, we developed an event driven simulator and
conducted comprehensive simulation experiments. Subsec-
tion 5.1 discusses the simulator that we developed and the
experimental setup. Subsection 5.2 discusses the simulation
results.
5.1. Simulator and Setup
As there exists no simulator for modelling the path-ID
based ICNs, we developed an event driven simulator [2] us-
ing an object-oriented approach and utilizing parallelism to
optimize time performance. As depicted in Figure 5, our
simulator consists of modules for realistic Internet AS topol-
ogy modeling, routing, packet representation and LogDos
strategies.
The simulation imports a predefined topology to create
the autonomous systems and the edges connecting the routers.
Once the topology is constructed, the simulator selects a vic-
tim and attackers randomly. Each simulation configuration
is run multiple times to compensate for possible edge cases
that have negligible probability but are possible. After des-
ignating a victim and all the attackers, the simulator finds
the shortest paths from the attackers to the victim to send
attack packets through. In order to simulate di erent log-
ging strategies of LogDos, all autonomous systems have a
logging strategy assigned to them.
Even though logging strategies di er, logging a packet
means putting it to bloom filters existing on each AS. To
achieve this, we employed Guava’s Bloom Filter implemen-
tation [11]. Before initiating the attacks, each bloom filter is
filled with random packets to imitate regular packet tra c.
Otherwise, the logging strategies would be deceptively suc-
cessful in catching attack packets. Simulating dynamic log-
ging strategy requires a notion time. To represent time, our
Figure 5: Simulator block diagram
simulator uses a customized tick based timing method where
all attack packets are assigned a random tick in which they
will be sent. The delta between the two ticks are used to set
router states appropriately before logging occurs. Our simu-
lations utilize AS-level topology of current Internet adopted
from [22] with its characteristics shown in Table 1.
Table 1
AS topology characteristics
Number of ASes 49,608
Number of Edges 212,543
Transient ASes 8,001
Core ASes 41,607
Average attack path length 3.86
Standard deviation of path length 0.04
5.2. Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the e ectiveness of the pro-
posed LogDos mechanism in defending against data flood-
ing attacks by considering the three versions of LogDos. Then
we discuss the storage overhead incurred by LogDos. Fi-
nally, we compare our LogDos to D-PID mechanism.
5.2.1. Countering Data Flooding Attacks
In the first set of experiments, our main objective is to
evaluate the e ectiveness of the proposed LogDos mecha-
nism in defending against data flooding attacks. The goal
is to evaluate attack tra c rate observed at the victim under
di erent simulation scenarios for each version of LogDos.
Starting by Comprehensive Logging, Figure 6 depicts the
overall attack rate observed at the victim for aggregate attack
rates of 1 Gbps, 2 Gbps, and 3 Gbps, respectively. In each
case, we vary the number of attacking ASes and distribute
the overall attack tra c among them. Attack ASes represent
autonomous systems that contain bot machines controlled by
the attacker. In our simulation experiments, we set the num-
ber of attacking ASes to 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000, re-
spectively. These ASes are selected randomly in each sim-
ulation run. In practice, bots are usually clustered in lim-
ited number of ASes [5]. Therefore, our choices of number
of attack ASes reflects realistic attack scenarios. As shown
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(a) Attack Rate = 1 Gbps (b) Attack Rate = 2 Gbps (c) Attack Rate = 3 Gbps
Figure 6: Attack rate at the victim- Comprehensive logging
in Figure 6, attack tra c rate at the victim increases by in-
creasing aggregate attack tra c rate from 1 Gbps to 3 Gbps.
However, it did not exceed 0.3 Mbps which is a very small
value and does not have great impact on the victim. By ad-
justing Bloom filter parameters to achieve low false positive
rates, the attack rate at the victim can be minimized signifi-
cantly to a value that does not exceed 1   10*2 Mbps. This is
due to the fact that attack tra c has very low chance to pass
through multiple routers along the path towards the victim.
In Section 4, we argued that it is possible to reduce the
storage overhead at LogDos-enabled routers without sacri-
ficing the ability to filter attack tra c by employing Odd,
Even, or Dynamic Logging techniques. A GET message will
be logged by ‚n_2„ routers in Odd Logging and by ‰n_2Â
routers in Even Logging, where n is the number of LogDos-
Enabled routers along the path. Hence, the probability of
filtering an attack packet is greater in case of Even Logging
compared to Odd Logging. This explains why Even log-
ging is more e ective than Odd Logging in filtering attack
tra c as shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively. Similar to
comprehensive logging, in Even Logging and Odd logging,
the attack tra c rate at the victim increases by increasing
aggregate attack tra c rate. However, it did not exceed 7
Mbps for an attack rate of 3 Gbps and relatively a large false
positive rate of 0.05 in case of Even Logging. On the other
hand, it also did not exceed 50 Mbps for an attack rate of 3
Gbps and relatively a large false positive rate of 0.05 in case
of Odd Logging. Simulation results show that, the overall
attack tra c rate observed at the victim drops sharply for
low false positive rates. This comes at the cost of increas-
ing bloom filter size at LogDos-enabled routers as we will
discuss in subsection 5.2.2.
In Dynamic Logging, LogDos-enabled routers perform
GET message logging and DATA message validation in an ad
hocmanner. Meaning that each router decides by itself when
to enable/disable LogDos mechanism. Therefore, along a
given attack path composed of n routers, there would be time
intervals when some routers are in the silent mode (i.e., Log-
Dos is disabled), which means that not all routers are ex-
pected to enable LogDos simultaneously. This explains why
Dynamic Logging is not as e ective as Comprehensive Log-
ging in terms of filtering attack tra c. However, it is com-
parable in performance to Even and Odd Logging as shown
in Figure 9. Similar to Comprehensive and Even/Odd Log-
ging, the overall attack rate observed at the victim increases
by increasing aggregate attack tra c rate. However, it re-
mains within acceptable range that does not have great im-
pact on the victim. Overall, the proposed LogDos mecha-
nism is very e ective against data flooding attacks as it can
filter more than 99.98 % of attack tra c in di erent attack
scenarios.
5.2.2. Storage Overhead
The size of the Bloom filter required at each LogDos-
enabled router for GETmessage logging depends on the over-
all GET messages arrival rate at the router. This in turn de-
pends on the number of router interfaces and their link rates.
In named data networking and according to [33], the over-
all number of PIT entries is estimated to be around 2M for a
medium scale router with 36 interfaces each with 10 Gbps.
We can project similar numbers for the number of entries to
be logged by LogDos-enabled router. However, bloom filter
size should be selected in such a way that the desired false
positive rate is achieved. There is a trade-o  between bloom
filter size and false positive rate. Figure 10 shows the rela-
tionship between bloom filter size and false positive rate for
di erent numbers of GET messages to be logged at a given
router ranging from 0.5M to 2M. In practice, these numbers
depend on di erent factors such as number of router inter-
faces, link rates, and router location.
For example, for a medium scale router that is expected
to log 2M GET messages, the required bloom filter size is
about 120 MB with false positive rate of 1   10*4 assum-
ing that the number of bloom filter hash functions equal to
3. For higher false positive rates and larger k values, the re-
quired bloom filter size becomes smaller. In general, It is
clear that the storage overhead incurred by LogDos mecha-
nism is not significant especially when applying Odd/Even
logging or Dynamic logging because it is not required to log
every GET message.
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(a) Attack Rate = 1 Gbps (b) Attack Rate = 2 Gbps (c) Attack Rate = 3 Gbps
Figure 7: Attack rate at the victim- Even logging
(a) Attack Rate = 1 Gbps (b) Attack Rate = 2 Gbps (c) Attack Rate = 3 Gbps
Figure 8: Attack rate at the victim- Odd logging
(a) Attack Rate = 1 Gbps (b) Attack Rate = 2 Gbps (c) Attack Rate = 3 Gbps
Figure 9: Attack rate at the victim- Dynamic logging
(a) Number of GETmessages = 0.5M (b) Number of GETmessages = 1.0M (c) Number of GETmessages = 1.5M (d) Number of GETmessages = 2.0M
Figure 10: Storage Overhead at LogDos-Enabled Routers
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5.2.3. Comparison with D-PID mechanism
A major problem in path-based ICNs is that an attacker
who learns path IDs can flood the victim with DATA packets
along the learned paths. In [21], it is shown that this can be
achieved using two major techniques. The first technique is
calledGET luringwhere a node under attacker’s control reg-
isters normal content names aiming at luring GET messages
from content consumers. Therefore, learning path IDs in-
cluded in these messages. The second technique is called
botnet cooperation where bots controlled by the attacker are
configured to exchange GET messages among each others. In
order to prevent attacker from performing data flooding at-
tacks even if they were able to learn path IDs (or part of
them), a mechanism called D-PID was proposed in [21]. D-
PID prevents DDoS attacks by changing path IDs in a dy-
namic way. In D-PID, every router negotiates a new set of
path IDs (PIDs) with its neighbours every T seconds, where
T is the PID update period. The major weaknesses of D-PID
are that it incurs communication overhead and it can not pre-
vent attacks that are based on periodically and continuously
learning PIDs. In contrast to that our LogDos mechanism
does not rely on keeping PIDs secret or on updating them
dynamically.
In order to evaluate the overall attack rate at the victim
in D-PID mechanism in case the attacker has the ability to
learn PIDs periodically, we performed set of experiments as-
suming that learning full paths from attackers to the victim
(i.e., list of PIDs along the path from attacker to victim) is
a Poisson process with rate   and that Path ID update pe-
riod is set to T seconds. Also, we assume that the number
of ASes controlled by the attacker = 100 and that attack rate
per attacking AS = 20 Mbps. Figure 11 shows the aggre-
gate attack rate at the victim for PID update periods 60, 120,
and 240 seconds, and for di erent values of   (the rate of
learning full attack paths). It can be seen that, D-PID fails
to defend against DDoS attacks in case the attacker is able to
quickly and periodically learn PIDs and identify full attack
paths. Even with relatively small PID update period of 60
s, an attacker can flood the victim with high volume attack
tra c reaching 2Gbps for  = 8. Figure 12 compares D-PID
to Even Logging for false positive rates of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2
respectively, while fixing the PID update period to 240 sec-
onds. It is clear that that attack rate observed at the victim
is very small even for a relatively large false positive rate.
With reference to the results discussed in Subsection 5.2.1,
it can be seen that our LogDos mechanism in its three ver-
sions outperforms D-PID mechanism in case attackers are
able to learn PIDs dynamically and periodically.
6. Conclusion
Addressing the significance of dealing with DDoS at-
tacks in future Internet architectures, we propose LogDos
mechanism to counter these attacks in path identifier-based
information centric networks. LogDos utilizes Bloom fil-
ter based logging to store incoming GET messages and ver-
ify them by storing a message only once per domain. We
propose three versions of LogDos, namely Comprehensive,
Odd/Even and Dynamic logging, with the objective of re-
ducing the storage and processing overhead while achieving
e cient filtering of attack tra c. We developed simulation
models of LogDos methods, and conducted extensive sim-
ulations using large-scale network topologies and realistic
attack scenarios. Simulation results show that di erent ver-
sions of LogDos are very e ective in countering data flood-
ing attacks by adjusting bloom filter parameters at LogDos-
enabled routers. For example, overall attack rate observed at
the victim did not exceed 0.3 Mbps, 7 Mbps, 50 Mbps, and
17Mbps out of aggregate attack rate of 3 Gbps for Compre-
hensive Logging, Even logging, Odd Logging and Dynamic
Logging, respectively. This is by large far away from the rate
observed at the victim in case of D-PIDmechanismwhen at-
tackers perform periodic PID learning. At the same time, the
storage overhead incurred by LogDos is relatively small.
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A. Bloom Filters
ABloom filter is a data structure for representing a set of
n elements (also called keys) to support membership queries.
The idea, as illustrated in Fig. 13, is to allocate a vectorR of
m bits, initially all set to 0, and then choose k independent
hash functions, each with range {1,...,m}. For each element,
A, the bits at positions H1(A), H2(A), ..., Hk(A) in R areset to 1. (A particular bit might be set to 1 multiple times.)
Given a query for B, we check the bits at positions H1(B),
H2(B), ..., Hk(B). If any of them is 0, then certainly B isnot inserted in the filter. Otherwise, we conjecture that B is
inserted in the filter although there is a certain probability
that we are wrong. This is called a "false positive". The pa-
rameters k and m should be chosen such that the probability
of a false positive is acceptable. The false positive rate of a
Bloom filter is given by the following equation:
p = (1 * (1 * 1
m
)kj)k ˘ (1 * e
kj
m )k (4)
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